Governance without government or: the Euro Crisis and what went wrong with European Economic Governance? by Heise, Arne
www.ssoar.info
Governance without government or: the Euro Crisis
and what went wrong with European Economic
Governance?
Heise, Arne
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Heise, A. (2012). Governance without government or: the Euro Crisis and what went wrong with European
Economic Governance? (ZÖSS Discussion Paper, 32). Hamburg: Universität Hamburg, Fak. Wirtschafts- und
Sozialwissenschaften, FB Sozialökonomie, Zentrum für Ökonomische und Soziologische Studien (ZÖSS). https://nbn-
resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-59842-0
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
[Geben Sie Text ein] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Arne Heise 
 
Governance without government  
or: The Euro Crisis and  
what went wrong with 
European Economic Governance? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ZÖSS 
ZENTRUM FÜR ÖKONOMISCHE 
UND SOZIOLOGISCHE STUDIEN 
 
Discussion Papers 
ISSN 1868-4947/32 
Discussion Papers 
Hamburg 2012 
 

  
 
 
Governance without government  
or: The Euro Crisis and  
what went wrong with 
European Economic Governance? 
 
 
 
Arne Heise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper 
ISSN 1868-4947/32 
Zentrum für Ökonomische und Soziologische Studien 
Universität Hamburg 
August 2012 
Impressum: 
 
 
Die Discussion Papers werden vom Zentrum für Ökonomische und 
Soziologische Studien veröffentlicht. Sie umfassen Beiträge von am 
Fachbereich Sozialökonomie Lehrenden, Nachwuchswissenschaft-
lerInnen sowie Gast-ReferentInnen zu transdisziplinären 
Fragestellungen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Herausgeber/Redaktion: 
 
 
 
Zentrum für Ökonomische und Soziologische Studien (ZÖSS) 
Kathrin.Deumelandt@wiso.uni-hamburg.de 
Fachbereich Sozialökonomie 
Universität Hamburg – Fakultät WISO 
Welckerstr. 8 
D – 20354 Hamburg 
Download der vollständigen Discussion Papers:  
http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereiche/sozialoekonomie/ 
forschung/zoess/publikationen/discussion-papers/
Heise: Governance without government or: The Euro Crisis and what went wrong with European Economic Governance? 
1 
 
Abstract 
The Great Recession after 2008 did not turn out to be as deep and severe as the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. According to the European Commission, this positive result is due to 
the fact that economic policy-makers around the world learnt their lessons from the Great 
Depression in stabilizing their financial systems and, moreover, that particularly the European 
Union and its economic governance system has become a shelter against negative external 
shocks in coordinating stabilization policies to maintain aggregate demand. 
This paper argues that the claim of the European Commission needs some qualifications: on 
the one hand, the lessons have not been applied appropriately in all EU and, particularly, 
Eurozone Member States. This is, on the other hand, not merely the result of mismanagement 
of individual governments but the systematic outcome of an ineffective and even counter-
productive European economic governance system. Although, in the wake of the Euro Crisis 
some crisis control and emergency measures have been established, crisis resolution has 
failed as the core of the inefficient governance system – the European Stability and Growth 
Pact (ESGP) – has not been reformed adequately. 
Key words: Euro Crisis, European Governance, Economic Policy 
JEL categories: B 59, F 15, H 30, N 10    
 
1. Introduction 
The Great Depression of the 1930s is still seen both in scope (being a truly world-wide 
phenomenon) as well as in as in acuteness as the most severe downturn in modern economic 
history. It had a strong impact on the economic science in paving the way for the ‘Keynesian 
revolution’ and disavowing the idea of unfettered markets, it triggered a sharp turn in 
economic policy from ‘laissez faire’ to interventionism and it was a break-through for large-
scale social policy programmes creating modern welfare states1. Only seven decade later, 
much of these ascriptions appeared outdated after a long ‘neoliberal era’ undermining the 
credibility of the Keynesian welfare state as an efficient institutional arrangement in a 
globalised world. Instead, retrenchment of the welfare state, de-activating fiscal policy and 
liberalising financial, labour and commodity markets became the unquestioned objectives of 
economic policy of the ‘Monetarist Counter-Revolution’ which took place since the 1970s 
(see Vercelli 2011, Bellofiore/Halevi 2011). 
After the World Financial Crisis hit the global world economies in 2008 and triggered the still 
ongoing Euro crisis, the question immediately arising is whether policy-makers throughout 
the world have learned their lessons if not in preventing such a global downturn from 
happening in the first place2, then at least in dealing with its consequences. Although, it 
certainly is of interest to compare different patterns of reaction (e.g. USA versus the 
Eurozone) or to inquire into the resilience or vulnerabilities of various countries or clusters of 
countries (such as the ‘liberal market economies’ or the ‘coordinated market economies’ of 
the varieties of capitalism literature), the focus here will be on the Eurozone. The reason is, on 
the one hand, to evaluate the European Commission’s claim to have learned its lesson (see 
European Commission 2009a) and, on the other hand, to investigate into how the Eurozone 
has managed to govern a situation of utmost crisis without a unitary actor, i.e. without a 
government. Has the European economic governance system worked adequately or is it at the 
                                                 
1
 For an account from an US perspective, see Bordo/Goldin/White (1998). More general: Vercelli (2011).  
2
 Hyman Minsky’s ‘Can it happen again?’ refers to the Great Depression and his prediction that it will happen 
again once all the institutional precautions of the Keynesian welfare state (‘big government’) are razed appears 
to have been validated in 2008ff.; see Minsky (1982).  
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roots of the ongoing trouble that has been termed ‘Euro crisis’? The paper is organised as 
follows: in the next part, a short comparison of the developments of the Great Depression 
(1929 – 1937) with the Great Recession (2008 – 2014) will be given in order to test the 
European Commission’s claim. Thereafter, the European economic governance system will 
be briefly displayed and from the discussion of its efficiency will some conclusions be drawn 
that will empirically be scrutinized in the following chapter. Finally, a conclusion will be 
provided. 
 
2. Great Depression and Great Recession – have we learnt our lessons? 
Unsurprisingly, causes and policy effects of the Great Depression are subject to heavy 
debate3: Was monetary policy a major cause of the Great Depression or merely aggravating 
it? Was it too expansionary or too restrictive prior to the outbreak of the great crash at Wall 
Street in September 1929? And what about its stance during the Great Depression? Or was it 
the unduly adherence to the Gold Standard in most countries that disallowed for an 
appropriate countercyclical monetary policy approach? And if the most widely held 
conviction is correct that monetary policy at least did not succeed in stabilizing the money 
supply, price level and credit outlays, was that the result of personal mistakes due to wrong 
beliefs, systematic incapabilities or even rent-seeking behaviour of the Fed (see Wheelock 
1992, Epstein/Ferguson 1984, Anderson/Shugart/Tollison 1988)?  
Concerning fiscal policy, it appears to be more settled that no countercyclical policy approach 
existed prior to the Great Depression. That is not to say, that the public budgets were always 
balanced or, even, that this was the target set by governments. Clearly, public budgets often 
went into deficit for quite some time and at quite some magnitude. However, the reasons 
almost always were to finance wars, not to intentionally intervene in economic processes (De 
Long 1998). Effectively this meant that some ‘automatic stabilizers’ are traceable prior to the 
Great Depression due to time lacks and bureaucratic inefficiencies in pursuing a balanced 
budget approach but, also, that ‘structural budgets’ (i.e. adjusted for these cyclical behaviour) 
acted pro-cyclical. Moreover, the picture changed only slightly under the ‘New Deal’ policy 
of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt: Although he claimed social and economic 
responsibilities for the Federal Government particularly in the area of employment policies, 
he was merely “a decidedly reluctant and exceedingly moderate Keynesian” (Kennedy 1999: 
361) when it came to fiscal policy. Although expenditure of the federal government rose quite 
markedly after Roosevelt took office, so did tax rates leaving the fiscal stimulus of the budget 
deficit rather low: “Fiscal policy, then, seems to have been an unsuccessful recovery device in 
the thirties - not because it didn’t work but because it was not tried” (Brown 1956: 863-866).   
Despite the general contingency with respect to the explanation of the Great Depression and 
the policy responses taken, the European Commission believes to be able to present “the main 
areas of agreement” (EU Commission 2009a: 20) by way of drawing up 5 major lessons: 
• 1st  Lesson: Maintain the financial system – avoid a financial meltdown 
• 2nd Lesson: Maintain aggregate demand – avoid deflation 
• 3rd Lesson: Maintain international trade – avoid protectionism 
• 4th Lesson: Maintain international finance – avoid capital account restrictions 
• 5th Lesson: Maintain internationalism – avoid nationalism 
                                                 
3
 See e.g. Wheelock (1992), Meltzer (1976), Temin (1976), Eichengreen (1992), De Long (1998) 
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While lesson no.1 is fairly obvious and trivial, the lessons no. 3 to 5 are related to trade and 
globalisation policies to avoid negative consequences of uncooperative distributional games. 
Taking the Eurozone as a common and domestic market representing a fairly closed economy, 
these lessons appear to be of second order. Therefore, it is basically lesson no. 2 which is 
most important and it is why the European Commission in a preliminary evaluation (taking 
only 2008 and 2009 into account) of the development of the Great Recession draws a rather 
positive conclusion: “All of the above lessons from the 1930s seem well learnt today …. The 
financial sector in most countries are given strong support, aggregate demand is maintained 
through expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, protectionism is so far kept at bay, (… ). 
Most important, the EU is now providing a shelter for the forces of depression in Europe. The 
EU, through its internal market, its single currency and its institutionalised system of 
economic, social and political cooperation, should be viewed as a construction that 
incorporates the lessons of the 1930s.” (EU Commission 2009a: 21 – 22). 
Taking a look at comparative GDP and unemployment developments (fig. 1 and 2), this 
judgement needs some qualifications: While the economic downturn and unemployment 
shock was definitely more severe – after initially the same impact in the first year (1930 and 
2009 respectively) – with respect to the major economies in the 1930s (here: the USA) as 
compared to the 2010s (here: the Eurozone) and the difference may be attributed to bank 
rescue and fiscal stimulus programmes, this is not quite true for some countries in the 
Eurozone: For instance Spain experienced almost the same GDP and unemployment 
developments now as then (over the first comparable 6 years) and Greece’s GDP 
development now almost parallels the GDP developments of the USA and Germany during 
the Great Depression: Although the decline is not as steep as it was in the USA and Germany 
in the 1930s, it already by now lasts longer than in these countries during the Great 
Depression.     
 
Figure 1: GDP developments in comparison  
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1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year 6 year 7 year 8 year
Great Depression - USA Great Recession - Eurozone Great Recession-Greece Great Recession - Spain
Great Recession - Portugal Great Depression - Germany Great Depression -Spain
 
Note: Great Depression refers to data as in Maddison (2007) and Smits/Woltjer/Ma (2009) for 
1929 – 1936; Great Recession refers to 2008 - 2013 
Source: European Economy statistical annex spring 2012; Maddison (2007) and 
Smits/Woltjer/Ma (2009) 
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Figure 2: Unemployment developments in comparison 
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Great Recession - Portugal
 
Note: Great Depression – Europe refers to data for Germany, France, UK, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Denmark and Sweden 
Source:  European Economy statistical annex spring 2012; Maddison (2007) and 
Smits/Woltjer/Ma (2009) 
   
It appears to mean that lessons had been learned: After the insolvency of the investment bank 
Lehman Brothers in the USA in 2008, most countries provided unprecedented bank rescue 
packages in order to keep the financial system from collapsing. Moreover, most countries also 
provided fiscal stimulus packages to maintain aggregate demand in conjunction with a 
historically expansionary monetary policy stance (see e.g. EU Commission 2009: 62ff., 
Zhang/Thelen/Rao 2010, Prascad/Sorkin 2009). Finally, collective bargaining systems and 
minimum wage legislations helped the nominal unit labour cost and price levels to remain 
roughly constant instead of severely dropping as was the case during the Great Depression 
and which would have been the normal reaction if labour markets and collective bargaining 
systems were only as flexible as perpetually demanded by mainstream economists.    
However, this is only half of the story. Obviously, in some countries the general lessons 
learned have not been properly applied. Again, this may be due to simple policy failures of 
individual actors, or it may the systematic shortcomings of an institutionalized system of 
‘governance without government’: Perhaps the European economic governance system, 
contrary to the EU Commission’s judgement, is not that well designed as to particularly 
implement the lesson no.2: to maintain aggregate demand. 
 
3. European Economic Governance and its shortcomings 
The ‘pre-Great Recession’ European economic governance system showed a complex pattern 
of hard and soft forms of mechanisms to coordinate national and sectoral policies (see tab. 1): 
the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG), the Employment Policy Strategy (EPS), the 
Cardiff Process (CP), the Open Method of Coordination in the field of social policy 
(OMC[Social Policy]) and the European Macroeconomic Dialogue (EMD)4 are forms of 
                                                 
4
 The EMD has been marked by gray shading in tab. 1 because it is the only EU economic policy process which 
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information exchange not capable of imposing sanctions and, therefore, without clearly 
traceable coordination effects (see e.g. Deroose/Hodson/Kuhlmann 2008). The European 
Social Dialogue (ESD) introduced a number of EU regulations that are binding for EU 
member states – however, due to the very restricted area of application, the ESD had only 
marginal impact on EU social policy.   
 
Table 1: Pre-Great Recession European economic governance system 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, it is basically the European Stability and Growth Pact (ESGP) which is relied upon 
to coordinate fiscal policies within the Eurozone in order to complement the common 
monetary policy. After demands from the German government, the Maastricht convergence 
criteria on fiscal policy had been hardened and prolonged for the time of existence of EMU: 
Based on Domar’s debt arithmetic (see Domar 1944), assuming a long-term growth trend of 
(nominally) 5 %5 and a sustainable public debt level of 60% of GDP6, the benchmark 
structural (i.e. cyclically adjusted) deficit level of public households has been set at 3% of 
GDP as one of the convergence criteria of the Maastricht treaty to be fulfilled by all potential 
members of the European Monetary Union (EMU)7. Despite the ‘no bail-out clause’ of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
is clearly based on a different theoretical foundation than mainstream economics. It had been introduced in 
1999 when a small ‘window of opportunity’ opened during the very short period of Social Democratic 
governments holding a majority in EU members states, the newly elected German (Social Democratic-led) 
government took the EU presidency and Finance Minister Oskar Lafontaine was determined to change EU 
macroeconomic policies. This constellation changed only months later, when Oskar Lafontaine resigned as 
German Finance Minister and the German government changed its economic policy outlook from broadly 
Keynesian to supply-side economics. Although the EMD is still existing, it has never been set to work 
properly.    
5
 Allowing for 2% as targeted inflation rate of the European Central Bank (ECB) this implied a potential real 
GDP growth rate of 3% for the Eurozone – quite an optimistic assumption. 
6
 Either the 60% government debt level is entirely arbitary or, as rumor goes, was either the average debt level of 
the potential Eurozone member states at the time of paraphrazing the Maastrict treaty (1992) or the expected 
debt level of France and Germany by the time of fulfillment of the convergence criteria (1997).  
7
 The derivation of the 3% deficit threshold – and its debt and growth assumptions - needs to be understood in 
Process Policy area Modus Dominant actor Theoretical basis Outcome 
BEPG Economic and 
fiscal policy 
Soft France 
(nominally), 
Germany 
(substantially) 
Economists  
EPS Labour market soft 
(OMC) 
France,  
EU- Commission 
neoclassical supply-
side economics 
Disappointing (see 
Kok-Report), Discours 
framing 
CP Commodity and 
financial markets 
Soft UK neoclassical 
microeconomics 
Information exchange 
EMD Monetary, fiscal 
and wage policy 
Soft Germany, Austria Neokeynesian Information exchange, 
marginal  
ESD Social policy  Hard by 
way or 
EU 
regula-
tions 
EU-Commission Neocorporatism Various EU regulations 
in work protection and 
Equal rights policies 
OMC 
(Social 
policy) 
Social policy 
(Health, 
pensions) 
Soft EU- Commission  Catalysator, Discours 
framing 
ESGP Fiscal policy hard by 
way of 
sanction 
Germany Neoricardian 
Equivalence 
theorem 
Restricting budgetary 
policies 
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Maastricht Treaty, which disallowed for a fiscal union in the Eurozone and kept the national 
governments fiscally self-responsible, the fiscal convergence criteria were put in place as 
selection device: only those countries that proved capable of pursuing a sustainable fiscal 
policy stance were allowed to join the club. As the few years of run-up to EMU could not be 
seen as a proof of a common fiscal philosophy of restriction and sustainability, the German 
government insisted on an institutional safeguard of such a fiscal policy stance after EMU had 
been set up8. The resulting European Stability and Growth Pact (ESGP) not only implemented 
a sanction mechanism, but also hardened the arithmetic deficit target: according to the 
convergence criteria, 3% of GDP was the structural (cyclically adjusted) deficit ratio, while 
the ESGP deliberately lowered this structural deficit ‘to close to balance or in surplus’ leaving 
the 3% benchmark as the upper threshold level of (cyclically unadjusted) total deficits that 
goes without sanction.  
Ever since its introduction, the ESPG has drawn critique: For those, that condemned fiscal 
policy altogether for its ‘government failure’ potentials of popular governments desiring to 
spent but not to tax (see e.g. Buchanan/Wagner 1977; Alesina/Perotti 1995) as well as for 
those that expected ‘free-rider behaviour’ to become paramount in a monetary union without 
restrictive fiscal rules (see e.g. Beetsma 1999, Beetsma 2001) undermining the credibility of 
price-stability oriented monetary policy (see e.g. Artis/Winkler 1999), the ESGP was still far 
too lax and vague in its enforcement procedure (see Schuknecht 2005; Feldmann 2003). For 
them, the ESGP was rather a further example of ‘soft’ instead of ‘hard’ coordination without 
the necessary incentives to provide the desired policy behaviour and the fact that the ESGP 
had been breached many times by almost every single Eurozone member state without ever a 
sanction being imposed, served as the proof of its ineffectiveness.  
Taking a look at some empirical evidence clearly disapproves this objection: There had been a 
marked restrictive turn-around in the fiscal policy stance within the Eurozone since the 
signing of the Maastricht treaty and the preparation for EMU. 
                                                                                                                                                        
order to reject the claim made by some renowned economists that there is no economic rationale for it (see 
Alesina/Perotti 2004: 13). This non-understanding may also be the reason why most economists have simply 
missed the fact that the ESGP is hardening the Maastricht convergence criteria. 
8
 “Germany was about to surrender control of its currency, and feared that this would endanger its long-
cherished monetary stability. As a consequence, it wanted to make sure that it would not have to share 
membership of the EMU with countries whose economic policy was, in some sense, grossly mismanaged. The 
budget deficit and government debt were the two best observable proxies for the somewhat hard to define 
notion of economic mismanagement” (Alesina/Perotti 2004: 13). Interestingly, the French government opposed 
all too strict fiscal rules as they were seen to cause economic distress – however, they only managed to change 
the name of the product – by including ‘Growth’ into the German proprosal of a ‘Stability Pact’ – but not the 
substance (see Heipertz/Verdun 2005: 993f., Heise 2005). 
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Figure 3: General government budget balances 1980 - 2005  
 
 
 
Source: European Commission – Ameco database; here taken from: Schuknecht (2005) 
 
As fig. 3 shows, from mid-1990 onwards, public budget deficits in the EU countries 
eventually forming the Eurozone more than halved – and this result holds as much for the 
Eurozone average as - and even more so - for the worst three performing countries (in terms 
of public debt ratio).    
 
Table 2: Budget consolidation before the World Financial Crisis 
Country Debt ratio 1998 Debt ratio 2007 Difference 
Eurozone 81,5 71,6 -9,9 
OECD 74,2 73,1 -1,1 
Germany 62,2 65,3 +3,1 
Greece 97,7 112,9 +15,2 
Italy 132,6 112,8 -19,8 
Ireland 62,1 28,8 -33,3 
Spain 64,2 36,2 -28,0 
USA 64,2 62,0 -2,2 
Japan 113,2 167,0 +53,9 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook; European Commission – Ameco databank 
 
Since the establishment of EMU and, hence, the operation of the ESGP in 1999 (see tab. 2), 
the public debt ratio has declined by 9.9 percentage points – far more than the OECD average 
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(-1.1 percentage points) or in the USA (-2,2 percentage points)9. Moreover, some of the 
countries that became known as ‘PIIGS’10 and had to resort to emergency measures provided 
by the EU during the recent ‘Euro crisis’ were among the countries consolidating their public 
debts most. 
      
Table 3: Structural deficits during 1999 – 2005 cycle 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Eurozone -1,4 -0,8 -2,6 -2,8 -2,8 -2,8 -2,5 
USA 0,6 1,2 -0,4 -3,1 -4,1 -4,2 -4,0 
UK 1,1 3,3 0,2 -2,3 -3,9 -4,2 -4,2 
 
Source: European Commission - Ameco database 
 
Finally, tab. 3 provides evidence that the ESGP not only restricted the fiscal policy stance in 
the Eurozone over a complete business cycle but also narrowed the discretionary room to 
manoeuvre in times of economic downturn as, for instance, during the ‘post-9/11’ recession: 
while structural deficits in the Eurozone during that time never exceeded 3% of GDP, in the 
USA and the UK a much stronger fiscal stimulus was given11. 
To briefly summarize, it must be stated that the ESGP had not been fulfilled prior to the 
World Financial Crisis in the strict interpretation of the ‘Excessive Deficit Procedure’ (EDP) 
of the European treatise – yet, a strong restrictive behavioural effect can hardly be denied12. 
Moreover, the discretionary capabilities in Keynesian fiscal policy orientation had also been 
curtailed. This, of course, brings us to the other voices in the critique of the ESGP: While the 
above-mentioned critics argued in favour of a fiscal rule as strict and inflexible as possible 
and lamented their inappropriate application, the second group of critics rejected the strictness 
and inflexibility of the ESGP on different grounds13. One criticism has been on the ‘one size 
fit’s all’ character of the ESGP rule being applied to countries of rather different economic 
development. According to the Domar arithmetic, sustainable public debt ratios may go along 
with varying (structural) public deficit rates if the growth rates only differ accordingly. 
Catching-up countries (mainly of the European south) supposed to converge to Eurozone 
averages in per capita GDP levels may be harmed if they are restricted in their attempt to 
follow a (deficit financed) ‘golden rule’ fiscal policy stance14.  
                                                 
9
 And the UK, which is not a Eurozone member and, thus, has not to comply with the regulations of the ESGP, 
managed to reduce its public debt ratio only by 2,2 percentage points although the time period under 
investigation covers the longest growth period in the modern economic history of the country. 
10
 ‘PIIGS’ stands for: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. 
11
 In conjunction with a more expansionary monetary policy stance both in the UK and the USA, this resulted in 
a macroeconomic policy mix better able to cope with the recessionary shock in the UK and the USA than in 
the Eurozone: average growth rates (2001 – 2005) were: UK = 2,9%, USA = 2,4 %, Eurozone = 1,7%.  
12
 As Schuknecht (2005: 78ff.) notes, there is a potential trade-off between complexity and enforcement of a 
fiscal rule. The more complex it becomes, the higher the monitoring cost will be reducing the pressure to 
comply. In this sense, on the one hand a simple fiscal rule such as the ESGP increases potential enforcement. 
If, on the other hand, simplicity reduces economic reasonability (‘economic soundness’) of a fiscal rule, some 
flexibility in its application is needed. Therefore, the performance of the ESGP may come close to an optimal 
solution to the complexity, enforcement, reasonability trilemma.   
13
 For a good overview of the different arguments see Heipertz (2003). 
14
 The ‘golden rule’ fiscal policy stance limits structural deficits to public investment outlays. 
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Another problem, and thus criticism, arises because of the intended suppression of 
discretionary (structural) deficits to cope with stabilization and growth problems: If the ESPG 
is applied according to its principles, balanced (structural) budgets leave no room for 
discretionary fiscal policy reactions on part of the national governments – which appears ever 
more harmful as the Europeanized monetary policy is also unavailable for stabilisation 
purposes (see e.g. De Grauwe 1998, Pisany-Ferri 1998). But if structural deficits are used in 
this sense15 within the confines of the 3% margin, automatic stabilizers will have to be 
curtailed accordingly and fiscal policy turns actively pro-cyclical (see Eichengreen 1996, 
Eichengreen/Wyplocz 1998a). 
Finally, and potentially the most devastating critic against the ESGP comes from the 
‘coordination literature’ which argues that an appropriate policy mix in order to maximize 
economic growth under the constraint of public budget sustainability needs an efficient 
institutional setting which will give the incentives to overcome the inherent ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’ (see e.g. Heise 2008, Pusch/Heise 2010, Willet 1999, Collignon 2008). A pre-
determined fiscal policy rule as in the ESPG will, in the best case, either be superfluous or, in 
the worst case, harmful. 
It turns out that, according to these criticism, the ESGP is not just ‘a minor nuisance’ 
(Eichengreen/Wyplocz 1998b), but may well be at the roots of the poor growth performance 
of the Eurozone prior to the World Financial Crisis as it does not allow the national 
governments to take appropriate action in the course of the business cycle and, moreover, 
does not allow for an appropriate (cooperative) policy mix. 
 
4. European economic governance under stress 
If the critics of the European governance system were right and contrary to the claim of the 
EU Commission, in a situation of a negative external shock one would not expect to find a 
policy reaction that is gauged towards the needs of the different regions of the Eurozone (i.e. 
the ensuing output gaps of the Member States) but a policy reaction that is led by the 
restrictive principles of policy coordination in the Eurozone or, by what may be termed the 
‘fiscal space’.    
 
                                                 
15
 It should also be noted that the exact fulfillment of the ESGP regulations would bring the public debt ratio 
down to zero in the long run (realistically assuming a positive average GDP growth rate) – which can hardly 
be interpreted as ‘optimal’ fiscal policy stance in any sense. 
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Figure 4: Fiscal policy reactions during the Great Recession in the Eurozone 
   
Note: Output gap measures the (aggreagte) difference of actual from potential output 2009 
and 2010, Fiscal stimulus in 0,1 % of GDP: 10 = 1% of GDP   
Source: European Commission – Ameco data bank and European Commission (2009b) 
 
Fig. 4 and 5 provide evidence that this is exactly the policy pattern that can be traced in the 
Eurozone: There is almost no correlation between the external shock of the World Financial 
Crisis (measured by the output gaps in 2009 and 2010) and the size of the fiscal stimulus 
packages being implemented in the Member States of the Eurozone – and this appears to 
contradict the result published by the EU Commission with respect to the entire EU, where 
“(t)he analysis (...) suggests that, overall, Member States whose negative output gap (i.e. their 
degree of economic slack) is largest, are also those that pursue the strongest fiscal stimulus – 
and vice versa” (EU Commission 2009a: 67f.). Taking the EU Commission’s result for 
granted, there must be a marked difference in the governance of the Eurozone and the non-
Eurozone EU member states. This becomes more obvious when ‘fiscal space’ as a measure of 
the room to manoeuvre of national governments is considered: Using the composite index 
‘fiscal space’ created by the EU Commission (see EU Commission 2009b) which covers 
ESGP-criteria and, therefore, institutional pressure (such as the debt ratio) as well as criteria 
that may capture market pressure (such as contigent liabilities to the financial sector and 
external imblances)16, a clear (positive) correlation between ‘fiscal space’ and the size of the 
fiscal stimulus package is discernable – a result very much in line with the ‘European 
Economic Recovery Plan’ (EERP) which had been agreed upon by the European Council in 
December 2008 and which was based expressis verbis on the restrictions of the ESGP (see 
European Commission 2008).         
                                                 
16The variables defining the composite indicator ‘Fiscal space’ are: a) the gross debt ratio, b) contingint liabilities 
in the financial sector, c) medium term tax shortfalls, d) current account balance and e) non-discretionary 
expenditure ratio. The market pressure of ‘fiscal space’ works via influencing risk premia on government 
bonds: The smaller the ‘fiscal space’, the higher the risk premium and the dearer it will be for governments to 
finance their deficits. Correlations between governments bond spreads and the ‘fiscal space’ indicator imply 
such market pressure. However, the weakness of this correlation and the fact, that the correlation of both 
indicators in non-Eurozone-countries (not restricted by the ESGP) is even weaker appear to hint to the 
presumption that the institutional restrictions of the ESGP work directly and also indirectly via inducing extra 
market pressure; see EU Commission (2009b: 186ff.).    
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Figure 5: Fiscal policy stance and fiscal space during Great Recession in the Eurozone  
      
Note: Fiscal space is measured as a composite indicator provided by European Commission 
(2009b). The Netherlands is omitted here as a strong outlier (not using its fiscal space for 
fiscal stimulus. If the country was included, R-square would drop to 0,3336   
Source: European Commission (2009b)    
 
The inherent logic of the European economic governance system – decried by its critics – is 
that who has ‘messed around’ with its public finances in the past, will not be able to react 
appropriately to external shocks and, thus, suffer economic hardship. Whether one subscribes 
to this logic – which may work as a pedagogical device only if it is executed in due course – 
or not (as it does not discriminate between different possible reasons for fiscal inordinateness 
in the past such as external shocks or internal misbehaviour17), it needs to be scrutinized in the 
light of deep recessions such as the World Financial Crisis as it may become an institutional 
device denying the above-mentioned lessons to be learnt: if the fiscal stimulus fails to spark 
off a cyclical turn, a country may easily find itself in a vicious circle of unsustainably high 
and illicit budget deficits, consolidation efforts, economic impairment and persistent or even 
growing budget deficits18. Again, there is empirical evidence that some Member States of the 
Eurozone are caught in such a vicious circle or, to put it differently, that the European 
economic governance system may systematically aggravate instead of contain initial 
economic slacks.     
 
                                                 
17
 Cafiso (2012: 72) highlights the importance of this disctinction. 
18
 Moreover, the likelihood of such a vicious circle to happen increases if austerity programmes are run under the 
conditions of overall economic slack, i.e. if the shortfall of domestic demand is not likely to be compensated 
for by foreign demand by way of a mercantilist strategy.  
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Figure 6: Fiscal strain, austerity measures and output gaps 2010-2012 
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Source: Ameco database, IMK Report No. 71, 2012, European Economy statistical annex 
spring 2012; own calculations 
 
It has been pointed out before that – partly due to the lack of ‘fiscal space’ – the fiscal 
stimulus given in 2009 and 2010 by the national governments under the ‘European Economic 
Recovery Programme’ was not appropriately dimensioned to meet the requirements of the 
Great Recession. The difference between an appropriate stimulus19 and the actual (realized) 
fiscal stimulus may be termed ‘fiscal strain’. As fig. 6 – 8 suggest, there is a mounting 
correlation between initial fiscal strain, austerity policies20 to bring down high deficits in line 
with consolidation programmes as part of the ordinary Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) of 
the ESGP or measures agreed upon with the ‘troika’ consisting of representatives from the 
IMF, the EU Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) and ensuing output gaps.  
 
                                                 
19
 To simplify the analysis, an ‘appropriate stimulus’ has been calculated in the following way: (GDP2009 – [-2]) 
x 3/5. A fall in GDP by -2% is supposed to be handled within the rules of the ESGP, i.e. the automatic 
stabilizers will not surpass the deficit threshold of -3% of GDP. Assuming a trend GDP of 3% at which the 
public budget is supposed to be balanced, this implies a fiscal multiplier of roughly 3/5.     
20
 In most Eurozone Member States, fiscal stimulus programmes and consolidation programmes overlapped in 
2010! 
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Figure 7: Austerity measures and output gaps 2011 – 2012 
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Source: Source: Ameco database, IMK Report No. 71, 2012, European Economy statistical 
annex spring 2012; own calculations 
 
The reaction of international financial markets to sanction such governments which find 
themselves unable to reduce deficits and debts as desired by raising interest rates to 
unprecedented levels only adds to the stress. For some, the immense increase in government 
bond risk premia are the main cause of the ongoing ‘Euro crisis’, requiring fiscal adjustments 
impossible to be achieved without adverse growth effects. Yet, although the short-run 
liquidity and the long-run solvency of governments are surely much affected by adverse 
financial market reactions, the evidence provided here is to argue that the ‘Euro crisis’ is not 
fundamentally based on such market reactions (see also Cafiso 2012). And others regard 
goverment bond risk premia merely as the consequence of unsolid fiscal behaviour in the 
past. However, new empirical evidence (see Pusch 2012) shows that the risk premia on 
Eurozone government bonds are determined by ‘fiscal fundamentals’ (such as past public debt 
and deficit levels for which national governments bear some responsibility) only to a minor 
degree – leaving explanatory space for ‘fundamental uncertainty’ in a Keynesian sense about 
financial market deveopments, the economic future of the Eurozone in general and some 
Member States in particular (for which national governments bear only limited 
responsibility). In this case, there is a good rationale for a common responsibility to access to 
financial markets at affordable interest rates (i.e. the working of the European Financial 
Stability Facility or the European Stability Mechanism).     
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Figure 8: Fiscal strain, austerity and output gaps 2010 – 2013 
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Source: Source: Ameco database, IMK Report No. 71, 2012, European Economy statistical 
annex spring 2012; own calculations 
 
5. Conclusion 
The Great Recession at the end of the first decade of our century has not turned out to be as 
severe as the Great Depression of the 1930s – and this is surely also due to the swift monetary 
and fiscal policy reactions of most governments and central banks. It is in this sense that the 
EU Commission’s claim that lessons from the Great Depression have been learnt, must be 
acknowledged. However, what is true in general, is not necessarily true for any particular 
country. Our study suggests that it is the institutional frame of economic policy coordination 
in the EU (and, particularly in the Eurozone) – the European economic governance system – 
which systematically prevents the application of the policy lessons and, thus, puts some 
Eurozone Members States on a course which very much resembles that of the Great 
Depression: not only is economic slack in these countries almost as bad as during the 1930s 
and its duration even potentially longer, also the uncompromising defence of institutional 
structures – the Gold Standard and its deflationary mechanism then, the monetary union and 
its austerity bias now – appear to aggravate the problems: the reform of the European 
economic governance system, hastingly pushed through during dozens of special or 
emergency summits of the European Council has managed to create crisis control and 
emergency measures such as the European Financial Stability Facility (and later: the 
European Stability Mechanism) which were not in place before the crisis. However, crisis 
resolution has not worked – neither in terms of overcoming slack economic conditions, nor in 
overcoming budgetary problems or in terms of tranquilizing financial markets – as the 
treatment basically used the same medicine and just increased the dosing: the ‘fiscal pact’ not 
only hardened the ESGP further by strengthening both the preventive as well as the corrective 
arm of the EDP but also ordered all Eurozone Member States to make a balanced budget a 
constitutionally based and implemented target. Moreover, the ‘Euro Plus Pact’ adressing 
regional trade imbalances is bound to keep up pressure on governmental (social) spending and 
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wage increases – most likely harming aggregate demand in the longer run and, in the worst 
case, initiating a wage-price deflation which has been prevented so far. 
The European economic governance system is politically based on mistrust which is 
nourished by the pre-crisis politico-economic mainstream of the economic science: it not only 
denies systematic and positive long-term effects of active stabilizations policies, but also boils 
down the complex budgetary decision making process in democratic societies to rent-seeking 
and moral hazard behaviour which, then, needs to be contained by strict and restrictive rules. 
The failure of this system becoming evident during the World Financial Crisis and being 
responsible for the ensuing ‘Euro Crisis’ presupposes as much radical reform as a fairwell to 
its supporting ideational basis – a situation which resembles that after the Great Depression. 
This is not the place to speculate about the exact features of a more appropriate and effective 
governance system but as the Great Recession has demonstrated the limits of ‘governance 
without government’ (yet with several goverments being tied in their national constituencies) 
in an institutional set-up created in neoliberal times, it stands to reason that a ‘Gouvernement 
Economique’21 based on modernized (post) Keynesian principles is a necessary step to be 
taken in order to avoid a final break-up of the European integration project.     
             
                                                 
21
 Clearly, ‘Gouvernement Economique’ is an opaque political term that needs to be filled with institutional 
contents. What is meant here is the historical lesson that monetary unions only survived under the condition of 
forming a unitary political actor, i.e. a nucleus of what became a political union eventually; see e.g. 
Heise/Heise Görmez (2011). 
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